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Inventi Impact: Computational Mathematics

Articles

  • Inventi:ecm/30/12
    CONSTRUCTIVE PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A FINITE STRATEGIC GAME WITH SEQUENTIALLY LOCALLY NONCONSTANT PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
    30-Sep-2012 Research 2012 : October - December
    Yasuhito Tanaka

    We will constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant\r\npayoff functions. The proof is based on the existence of approximate Nash equilibria which is proved by Sperner�s lemma. We\r\nfollow the Bishop-style constructive mathematics.

    How to Cite this Article
    CC Compliant Citation: Yasuhito Tanaka, â??Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with\r\nSequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions,â? ISRN Computational Mathematics, vol. 2012, Article ID 459459, 8 pages, 2012.\r\ndoi:10.5402/2012/459459.
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