This paper investigates the secrecy and reliability of a communication where the user is assisting an Intrusion Detection System\n(IDS) in detecting the adversaryâ??s attack.The adversary is assumed to be sophisticated such that it can conduct eavesdropping and\njamming attacks.The IDS is equipped with the capability of detecting both of those attacks. Two scenarios were considered; the first\nscenario is that the user is trying to detect the adversary by assisting the IDS, and the second scenario is that the user is equipped\nwith a silent time slot in its communication protocol besides assisting the IDS, in order to provoke the adversary into jamming the\nchannel, thus detecting it with a higher probability. Interestingly, adding the capability of detecting eavesdropping attacks pushed\nthe adversary into conducting jamming attacks much more, thus aiding in detecting the adversary earlier. All of that was modeled\nby means of stochastic game theory, in order to analyze and study the behavior and the interactions between the user and the\nadversary. Results show a major improvement in the first scenario by 188% and an improvement by 294% in the second scenario in\nthe game value when the probability of detecting eavesdropping attacks was 0.3, which represents the payoff that the user gains in\nterms of secrecy and reliability.
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