Game spaces in which an organism must repeatedly compete with an opponent for\nmutually exclusive outcomes are critical methodologies for understanding decision-making under\npressure. In the non-transitive game rock, paper, scissors (RPS), the only technique that guarantees\nthe lack of exploitation is to perform randomly in accordance with mixed-strategy. However,\nsuch behavior is thought to be outside bounded rationality and so decision-making can become\ndeterministic, predictable, and ultimately exploitable. This review identifies similarities across\neconomics, neuroscience, nonlinear dynamics, human, and animal cognition literatures, and provides\na taxonomy of RPS strategy. RPS strategies are discussed in terms of (a) whether the relevant\ncomputations require sensitivity to item frequency, the cyclic relationships between responses, or\nthe outcome of the previous trial, and (b) whether the strategy is framed around the self or other.\nThe negative implication of this taxonomy is that despite the differences in cognitive economy and\nrecursive thought, many of the identified strategies are behaviorally isomorphic. This makes it difficult\nto infer strategy from behavior. The positive implication is that this isomorphism can be used as a\nnovel design feature in furthering our understanding of the attribution, agency, and acquisition of\nstrategy in RPS and other game spaces.
Loading....