In recent years, evolutionary game theory has been gradually applied to analyze and predict network attack and defense for\nmaintaining cybersecurity. The traditional deterministic game model cannot accurately describe the process of actual network\nattack and defense due to changing in the set of attack-defense strategies and external factors (such as the operating environment\nof the system). In this paper, we construct a stochastic evolutionary game model by the stochastic differential equation with\nMarkov property. The evolutionary equilibrium solution of the model is found and the stability of the model is proved according\nto the knowledge of the stochastic differential equation. And we apply the explicit Euler numerical method to analyze the\nevolution of the strategy selection of the players for different problem situations. The simulation results show that the stochastic\nevolutionary game model proposed in this paper can get a steady state and obtain the optimal defense strategy under the action of\nthe stochastic disturbance factor. In addition, compared with other kinds of literature, we can conclude that the return on security\ninvestment of this model is better, and the strategy selection of the attackers and defenders in our model is more suitable for actual\nnetwork attack and defense.
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