Current Issue : January - March Volume : 2020 Issue Number : 1 Articles : 5 Articles
Objective. This study documents the extent of tobacco ads in retail stores and evaluates its association with the comprehensiveness\nof local tobacco control policies in the state of Massachusetts, US. Methods. Using a two-stage cluster sampling method, we\nsampled 419 retail stores across 42 municipalities to assess the presence and count of nine mutually exclusive tobacco ad\ncategories. Tobacco ads by store type and municipality were analyzed using summary statistics and contingency tables. Regression\nmodels tested the association between the extent of tobacco ads and local tobacco control policy comprehensiveness. Results.\nOverall, 86.6% (n = 363) of all the retail stores had tobacco ads. On average, there were 6.7 ads per retail store (SD = 6.61) and 2804\nads across all the retail stores (range = 0 : 32). Retail stores had an average of three different categories of tobacco ads (mean = 2.98,\nSD = 1.84). Across all retail stores, the most frequent ad categories were power walls (80.0%) and e-cigarette ads (55.8%). Retail\nstores in municipalities with more comprehensive local tobacco control policies were more likely to have fewer tobacco ads\n(IRR = 0.92,p < 0.01) and a lower number of tobacco ad categories (OR = 0.88,p < 0.05). Conclusion. Municipalities can adopt\nmore comprehensive tobacco control policies to help limit the extent of tobacco retail advertising. This can ultimately reduce\nsmoking in their jurisdiction....
Reference quality, as a benchmark against which the purchase quality of a product is judged, has an important impact on consumersâ??\npurchase decision, especially perishable items.Thus, howto determine an appropriate quality investment and ordering strategies for\nperishable items to maximize retailersâ?? profit is an essential task. A joint dynamic quality investment and inventory replenishment\nproblem for perishable items with consideration of reference quality effect is investigated, where the retailer sells its products using\na combination of the offline and online stores, and the sales function is sensitive to productsâ?? quality and consumersâ?? reference\nquality. The optimal control model is established to maximize the retailerâ??s total profit by making a joint quality and inventory\nstrategy.The continuous time dynamic optimal quality investment and inventory replenishment strategies with reference quality\neffect are obtained by Pontryaginâ??s maximum principle. Numerical experiments are accounted for the key system parameters on\nthe optimal strategies....
This paper examines optimal pricing in a two-tier product and service supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in\nthe context of vertical competition in extended warranty in two cases: one considering the retailerâ??s fairness concerns and one\nwithout considering the retailerâ??s fairness concerns. A manufacturer-dominated product and service supply chain game-theoretic\nmodel on the Stackelberg model is developed to analyse how the level of vertical competition in extended warranty service and the\nintensity of a retailerâ??s fairness concerns influence the optimal pricing of products and extended warranties for the manufacturer\nand retailer. /is study finds the following: (i) Two parties of the supply chain employ differential pricing strategies for extended\nwarranties when the retailer has fairness concerns. (ii) Compared to the same pricing strategies for extended warranty service\nwhen the retailer has no fairness concerns, the increase of competition intensity of vertical extended warranty service will enlarge\nthe price difference of extended warranty service. Meanwhile, it is the intensity of fairness concerns that determines the influences\nof retailerâ??s fairness concerns on the price difference of extended warranties. (iii) If no fairness concerns are raised, an increase in\nthe level of vertical competition in extended warranty service would benefit both supply chain parties, rather than hurting their\nprofit. If the retailer is fair-minded, its fairness utility increases when the intensity of the fairness concerns rises in a reasonable\nrange and decreases when the intensity exceeds the reasonable range, but for the manufacturer, its profits will be damaged as long\nas the retailer raises fairness concerns....
People may have a tendency to prefer local or national products, a phenomenon\noften referred as local protectionism. In the meanwhile, consumption of\noversea or well-known products is a symbol of social status. An important\nquestion for both non-Chinese and Chinese manufacturers and researchers is\nwhether Chinese prefer local or oversea products? Previous studies have\nshown that explicit survey is often not reliable, thus an Implicit Association\nTest (IAT) study is conducted with 80 Chinese college students (40 males and\n40 females) to investigate their implicit place-of-origin stereotypes about\nChinese and foreign mobile phone brands. The results show that implicit\nplace-of-origin stereotypes about mobile phone brands do exist among Chinese\ncollege students. They implicitly prefer, to various extents, foreign mobile\nphone brands, and male college students in particular are less interested\nin Chinese mobile phone brands. This study demonstrated an important application\nof the Implicit Association Test and has important application in\nguiding the marketing of products....
In this paper, we propose a supply chain contract model aimed to coordinate a three-echelon supply chain, which is based on the\nrevenue-sharing allocation with loss-aversion preference. We consider a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral\nmanufacturer, a risk-neutral distributor, and loss-averse multiple retailers. To address this model, we consider a shortage product\nproduced and sold within a single period in the stochastic market. The model allows the system efficiency to be achieved as well as\nit will improve the profits of all supply chain members by tuning the contract parameters. We used the expected utility function to\ndescribe the loss-aversion memberâ??s influence coefficient. The decisions of chain members under different conditions are studied\nby simulation analyses. The paper also analysed the relationship between different revenue-sharing coefficient combinations with\nmultiple retailers in the supply chain system. Furthermore, the study has addressed the supply chain coordination decision bias in\nthe centralized and decentralized systems....
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